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Peasants and the Great Leap Forward
Marissa Warren
INTRODUCTION
Countries following Marxist ideology have typically showed a disinterest of the
peasantry and sometimes even outright hostility. When it came to revolutions within these
Marxist countries, the peasantry was typically forced following their government’s demands.
These countries used their peasantry, always on the government’s own terms. That is, they never
asked the peasantry what could be done for them, but rather simply demanded the peasantry
follow them. China, prior to the “Great Leap Forward,” suffered through a civil war, putting a
new Party in charge of the government. This government chose to include peasants in their
revolution and promised them what they desired in return. Due to this new function and ideology
in leadership, collectivization within China was a relatively resistance free movement. This paper
will focus on five political factors implemented within China just prior to their collectivization
movement that will be used to explain the lack of resistance within China compared to Russia.
PRIOR TO COLLECTIVIZATION
To argue the case of five political factors being responsible for the lack of resistance in
China’s collectivization period, we must first examine how the peasants were treated up until
that point. In both China and Russia, Marxist ideology was pertinent, and Karl Marx (18181883) did not believe the peasants could start their own socialist revolution. He considered their
cultural horizons barbaric and idiotic due to the fact they were isolated from the main currents of
civilization. 1 Marx stressed the idea that peasants were incapable of organization and concerted
action and thus could never lead themselves to a socialist revolution. 2 Marxist countries then
interpreted this message to mean the proletariats were the only social class able to create the
environment for a socialist revolution. Of course, the peasants still had to be willing to be led by
the proletariats to succeed.
Both Lenin and Stalin viewed peasants as a difficult barrier to economic modernization. 3
They didn’t believe they could be an asset to the revolution; they were instead an obstacle the
country had to collectively overcome. Mao and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), on the
other hand, believed Marx had not really set a clear definition of who the peasants were and their
role in society. Mao, seeing the number of peasants within the country, decided to make the
peasantry the biggest force in his revolution. 4 Both Russia and China attempted to adhere to
Marxist ideology, but China’s revolution took the peasantry and made them the majority force.
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For the Great Leap Forward to commence, the CCP had to overcome the Chinese
Nationalist Party (KMT). The CCP was founded in 1921 by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao as a
soviet style communist Party and operated as a separate Party from the KMT, attempting to gain
power and support for a new communist country. In 1922, the KMT and the CCP created the
first United Front to end the reign of warlords throughout China. The CCP used the KMT to
spread communism through their greater numbers, while the KMT hoped to control the
communists. In the end, their goals diverged, resulting in a civil war in China.
Beginning in 1927, the CCP and KMT for the next ten years actively fought each other
for power. During this ten year period, the KMT managed to suppress the CCP, and remained in
control of China. It was during these years that the ideas of Mao rose to popularity within the
CCP. He believed the peasantry within China was “a force so swift and violent that no power,
however great, will be able to hold it back.” 5 With these ideas in place, the CCP fought for
power by promising the peasants extensive land reform and punishment of cruel landlords. 6
In 1937, civil war within China was brought to a standstill with the need for a second
united front in order to combat the incoming Japanese forces. The CCP and KMT were to work
together, but Mao demanded the communist’s red army keep their autonomy, and the KMT
would only give requests not orders. 7 The CCP used the second Sino-Japanese war as a means to
expand their power and influence. While the KMT fought hard at the front, Mao ordered his
forces move in behind the Japanese lines and set up local governments. 8 Mao would then begin
land reform in these newly acquired territories and incorporate the peasantry into their battles. 9
The united front displayed by the KMT and CCP during this time was used to legitimize
the Communist Party in the eyes of the peasantry. 10 Peasants believed they had suffered at the
hands of the Japanese and wanted to fight. Prior to the war, the peasants had no interest in
politics, but during the war the CCP stressed the importance of Nationalism and thus completely
disregarded the dedication to Nationalism displayed by the KMT. 11 The peasantry found the
communists to be the most competent organizers of the resistance, and due to the low casualty
numbers compared to the KMT at the time, they also believed the CCP was winning the war. 12
The peasantry especially applauded the communists’ use of guerilla warfare in fighting
the Japanese, and they found this type of warfare successful, believing they could defeat the
Japanese with it. Mao believed that “in a war of revolutionary character, guerilla operations are a
5
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necessary part” in winning. 13 By the end of the second Sino-Japanese war in 1945, the peasantry
had six years of communist led anti-Japanese guerilla victories, which in turn strengthened the
communists’ perceived leadership abilities. 14 The second Sino-Japanese war is recognized as the
CCP’s true rise to power, even though they wouldn’t officially come to power until 1949.
In 1946, the united front of the KMT and CCP officially collapsed, and the parties were
once again at war. By this time, the KMT had lost most of its momentum, and the power shifted
to the communists. The KMT controlled more of the industrial areas of China, while the CCP
controlled most of the countryside. When the CCP began taking more of the industrial sectors,
the KMT quickly lost their ability to fight, and the CCP proclaimed China a communist
government on October 1, 1949. 15 That December, the leader of the KMT Chiang Kai-Shek and
some of the remaining nationalists fled to Taiwan. The CCP had officially rid themselves of the
KMT and acquired control over the Chinese government.
THE SOVIET UNION: A COMPARATIVE CASE
Stalin’s collectivization of the rural Russian countryside began in 1928. The
collectivization in the Soviet Union was in a no way a voluntary movement but rather a
government sanctioned order. For the peasants, collectivization was seen as a second serfdom
and complete destruction of their way of life. 16 Following the implementation of collectivization
the nation suffered the closing of churches and markets, desecration of religious objects, animal
slaughtering, and peasant riots. 17 The peasantry, already naturally distrustful of the government
due to past experience, were even more so when the atheist communists came to power and were
most definitely not ready to receive or accept orders from their new government when there was
no trust between them. 18
The peasantry revolted to an even greater extent due to how they were treated by
government and local officials. Bolshevik leaders would requisition grain in a ruthlessly
thorough way, often leaving little to nothing for the peasants’ survival. 19 Due to pressures from
both above and below, communist officials often enacted outrageous repressions, arrests, and
violent actions against the peasantry in order to gain compliance. 20 A new ideology spread
throughout the countryside: “You don’t participate, you don’t live.” 21 By 1930, the “kulaks,”
13
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those individuals who refused to give up their grain, were seen as the major problem with
collectivization. Thus began dekulakization, which in turn affected not only the kulaks, but also
the entire countryside. 22 This new special resettlement policy for kulaks resulted in tens of
thousands of deaths and an equal number of runaways. 23 By ridding the country of some of its
hardest workers, the Soviet Union also suffered a loss in their food production, ultimately
leading to a severe famine and killing around seven million people between 1932-1933. 24
The peasantry refused to take threats to their way of life lying down. They participated in
both indirect and direct violent forms of resistance. Many peasants, unable to hide their grain,
just disposed of it or even destroyed it. 25 Some peasants participated in illegal grain transfers,
massive hoardings, and the slaughtering of their own livestock. Between 1928 and 1933, the
numbers of cattle in the Soviet Union fell by half. 26 Peasants often abstained from work
altogether. In a letter to Pravda from a collective farm in Kaluga Okrug, one man writes, “You
can take from us today, but tomorrow there’ll be nothing to winnow because we won’t want to
get it ready.” 27 Some members of the peasantry tried to peacefully present their problems but
were met with force and disinterest, which led to increasing violent action taken against the
oppressors. Peasants often committed arson, lynching and assaults on local authorities, burned
crops, and destroyed property. 28 By 1935, an estimated eleven million people were dead, and
five million perceived kulaks were in labor camps. 29
Mao and the CCP looked to the Soviet Union for how to not only construct their party,
but also handle the peasantry. They saw the bloody and violent reaction of the peasantry to the
Bolsheviks during their collectivization movement and opted for another method. The Chinese
communists learned from the Soviet Union that force and manipulation are not effective ways of
swaying the peasantry to their side. They instead focused on gaining the support of the peasantry
through incentives and perceived comradery.
COUNTER-ARGUMENT
One counter-argument to this claim acknowledges the fact that, regardless of the CCP’s
attempts to win the peasantry over with grand promises and incentives, ultimately the Great Leap
Forward resulted in the Great Leap Famine from 1958-1962, killing millions of people. Prior to
the Great Leap Forward, the CCP enacted five political factors believed to both help the overall
resistance to the collectivization of agriculture and reap rewards for the peasantry. Unfortunately,
22
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in the years following 1958, these five factors most definitely did not benefit the peasantry and in
fact directly resulted in millions of reported deaths. The peasants were promised opportunities,
such as the right to self-determination and the opportunity to both join and leave the collectives
voluntarily. Toward 1958, however, the CCP and Mao grew more concerned with how China
faced in relation to other countries and wanted to not only catch up with countries like Britain
and America, but also surpass them. They became obsessed with how productive and strong they
appeared to the rest of the world, so that in the end they ultimately forgot about their own
people’s well-being.
By 1958, the idea of volunteer collectives had disappeared, and the government followed
Stalin’s model of forced collectivization. 30 Mao and members of the CCP believed they could
increase both their agricultural and industrial sections simultaneously and thus needed more
peasants in the collectives to not only produce grain, but also work backyard furnaces to create
steel. 31 Once the peasants’ free choice to stay in the collectives was revoked, their incentives
began to change as well. They could no longer back out if someone else in the collective were
not doing adequate work. Thus, when one member of the collective began to fall behind, it
trickled down to other members within the collective. 32
When there is less incentive to work, production decreases as well. Unfortunately for
local authorities, the communist Chinese government prized efficiency. To appear successful,
local authorities would inflate their numbers on production, which in turn only increased the rate
of procurement within the collectives as well. To meet procurements, the local militias tore
through villages searching for hidden grain and confiscated everything from the local
peasantry. 33 The government grew so focused on being the best that they denied what was
happening in their own country not only to the world, but also themselves.
To save face with the rest of the world, Mao and the CCP refused to accept any loans,
receive help, or even defer payment during the famine. 34 Instead, they made their export
production the most important aspect of the country. Mao and members of the CCP were
obsessed with their export markets and thus, even during widespread famine, continued to export
most their grain. Grain exports were the most important thing to the government in 1960, and
farmers were put further down the list of people to receive surplus grain. 35
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Farmers lost control of not only their land and harvests, but also their work schedules. 36
The peasantry began working constantly to keep up with grain procurement rates while
simultaneously battling famine and disease. Due to the policy on communal dining halls,
peasants no longer had private plots to grow food, and when famine struck there was nothing left
for them to fall back on. 37 Farmers were left to fend for themselves, while the ranks of the
privileged workers within the city swelled. 38 For survival, the peasantry began tearing down their
houses and other buildings to provide not only nutrients for their soil, but also a new source of
food. 39 In Hunan, forty percent of houses were destroyed by 1960, leaving a large majority of
their population without shelter from the elements. 40 Accounts of cannibalism ravaged the
countryside, and human flesh was sold on the black market for a good price. 41 Due to the eating
of unnatural things, many people became sick, and disease was rampant. This led to a collapse of
health care services within the countryside, something promised to the peasantry since the CCP
first came into power. 42
By 1960, over a million people were dead due to the widespread famine throughout the
Xinyang region. 43 Other reports included one in four people, in a local population of half a
million, dying in Guangshan. 44 Mao’s response to the famine crisis involved telling the peasants
to eat less if starvation was an issue. 45 Mao believed that “when there in not enough to eat,
people starve to death. [So] It is better to let half of the people die so that the other half can eat
their fill.” 46 Of course due to the policies surrounding the nation at this time, the half that was
chosen to starve to death was the peasantry. According to archival evidence, an estimated fortyfive million people died in the Great Leap Famine from 1958-1962. 47 Despite this treatment, the
peasants in China revolted against collectivization to a lesser extent than the peasants in the
Soviet Union under Stalin, due, in part, by the way the peasantry was handled up until the point
of famine.
FIVE POLITICAL FACTORS
In China, the collectivization movement that sprung up during the Great Leap Forward
was met with little opposition from the peasants. According to Yu Liu, this lack of resistance can
be explained by five political factors within China prior to collectivization. These factors
include: land reform, the socio-political classification system, the control of social mobility, the
36
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leadership within the rural Chinese Community Party system, and the nature of the political
discourse that surrounded agricultural collectivization. 48 This paper will argue that the lack of
resistance in China was greatly dependent on the CCP’s relations and incorporation of the
peasants in the community prior to collectivization, compared to the seclusion and violence
impacting the peasantry in the Soviet Union.
LAND REFORM
Land reform within China was created to change peasant’s old ideologies of family and
clan so they would be more submissive to authority. 49 The CCP hoped that by showing the
peasants their support and fighting for their opportunities, the peasants would submit to them in
gratitude. The land reform ultimately took away land from landlords and rich peasants and
distributed it amongst the other poor and middle peasants. The CCP believed the process of land
reform needed to be gradual and controlled to, as Mao put it, “minimize any feeling that their
(the peasant’s) mode of life is being changed all the sudden.” 50 So to gain the peasant’s trust, the
CCP first gave the land to the peasants and then slowly took it away again. They began
collectivization in four steps:
First, they gave the land to the peasants. Second, they created mutual aid
teams that the peasants operated. Third, they created elementary co-ops
that involved land/animals collectively being owned, but the peasants
received income based on their labor efforts. Lastly, they created the
advanced co-ops where dividends were discontinued and members
received income solely on their labor contributions to the collective
farm. 51
Essentially, they gave peasants the land they wanted and then slowly proceeded to take it away.
In the Soviet Union, the peasants had already been through a collective era and found it
only made them work harder for smaller income. 52 They were also already operating on a system
that allowed only a few privately-owned lands, while also working collectively on other farms.
Land reform worked so well for China in dissuading the peasants from rebelling because they
gave the land back to the peasants before taking it away. Whereas in the Soviet Union, the
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peasantry viewed the government, and especially Stalin, distrustfully and found they simply
wanted to take their land away for their own purposes. 53
The CCP wanted the peasants involved in the land reform process as much as possible, to
help them realize their power and recognize the Party as allowing them this opportunity. It
encouraged peasants to speak out about their grievances and become more educated about the
power they had been granted. Many peasants chose this opportunity to lash out at the landlords
who they had previously worked for. In Huanghuang County, a work report showed 5,184
speakers called out landlords and expressed some type of wrongdoing that had been inflicted
upon them. 54 Mao and the CCP began to emphasize the peasant community differences from the
higher classes. 55 This in turn encouraged the peasants to take their lives into their own hands and
fight back against their “oppressors.” The Party wanted the peasants to be involved in the
violence on landlords to really brand them as Mao supporters and thus instill a fear of retribution
at the hands of Chiang Kai-Shek should they ever oppose the CCP. 56 At its core, land reform was
instituted in China to create obvious class distinctions.
SOCIO-POLITICAL CLASSIFICATION
The CCP made land reform about fighting unjust landlords and creating a strong “we”
versus “them” mentality among peasants. 57 Once land reform took effect, this created a whole
new socio-political classification. According to Guo Wu, creating land reform and speaking out
about its purpose allowed for six major developments within the Chinese peasantry:
(1) It made peasants understand the landlord class and know who they
should oppose; (2) it enlightened poor peasants and awakened their class
consciousness; (3) it alienated peasants from landlords by drawing a line
between them; (4) it was a good method of peasant self-education; (5) it
helped establish an intellectual foundation for the mass’s execution of the
Party’s policies; and (6) it made cadres realize feudal society and promote
class sentiments. 58
The Party encouraged the peasants to share their stories and sent work teams into the community
to gain their trust. These teams worked alongside the peasants and became a part of their family,
ultimately leading the peasants to trust them and tell them their stories. 59 From there, meetings
were set up for the peasants to tell their stories by the masses. The Party constantly reiterated the
class differences and created different class enemies for the peasantry to fight. 60 In short, the
CCP won support by challenging the current rural power relationship and giving power to the
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peasantry. 61 Of course, once the rural social power had been destroyed, peasants no longer held
organizational ground for any social resistance. 62
Naturally, the Soviet Union also attempted to divide their peasantry on class distinctions
but did not succeed to the same extent as China. The Soviet Union attempted to divide class by
creating the “kulaks” and telling the poor peasants that the reason they are suffering is because of
this richer class. However, the Soviet Union did not realize the respect the “kulaks” received
within the countryside or their positive roles in that society. 63 The Mir within the Soviet
countryside was still playing a large role between 1922 and 1927, and the “kulaks” carried a lot
of weight within that structure. 64 The “kulaks” were viewed as hard workers, and when the
Bolsheviks purged them from the countryside many of the villages took a hit in productivity. 65
Finally, the Soviet Union drastically underestimated the peasantry’s ability to band together
when all its economic and cultural practices were threatened. 66
Both countries knew they needed to divide the peasantry to have someone to fight besides
their government. The CCP looked at what transpired in the Soviet Union, saw they had
underestimated the power of the peasantry and did something different. Within China, the Party
gave the peasantry a clear enemy: the landlords. They completely changed up the power
structure within the countryside, unlike in the Soviet Union where the Mir was still heavily
influential, thus making “kulaks” heavily influential. They also hadn’t previously experienced
the collective farms as had the peasantry in the Soviet Union. Of course, the peasantry within the
Soviet Union had a taste of what the collective farms did to the countryside overall and knew
that joining together would be the best approach in maintaining their livelihood.
SOCIAL MOBILITY
The social mobility of the peasantry was also hindered prior to collectivization through
the state controlled purchase and sale of grains and the establishment of the hukou, or household
registration. The Chinese government implemented the Central Purchases and Central Supply
system because of grain deficits and their loss of control over grain supplies. 67 They hoped by
instituting this system they would once again gain control over grain production. With this
system, the government purchased all surplus grain at a set price and resold it to the peasants
who needed it in the spring. 68 Unfortunately, though successful, the implementation of the
system was not smooth, and many of the peasants did not receive the grain they needed. By not
61
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meeting these needs, the government failed in its promises to improve the peasant farmer’s living
conditions. 69 As a direct result, many peasants couldn’t move because they faced starvation. 70
The hukou within China hindered the mobility of the peasantry, as it required peasants to
acquire special permission to leave the rural area. In 1951, the Ministry of Public Security,
through the “provisional regulations on urban hukou management,” legally insisted that
individuals gain official permission to migrate from their homes. 71 When collectivization was
about to begin, the government deliberately enforced and strengthened this regulation in
anticipation of a large group of people wanting to migrate. 72 Though many peasants did not
even try to migrate at the onset of collectivization, the regulation successfully kept rural peasants
in their rural sector.
Within the Soviet Union, three factors affected attempts at keeping the rural countryside
in place. First, between 1928 and 1932, Russians poured into urban areas. The expansion of
industrialization was under way and thus created a surplus of new urban employment
opportunities. 73 The communists believed there was a surplus of people in the rural populations
and that ultimately industrialization would draw the surplus out, thus creating no reason to worry
about lack of rural workers. 74
The second reason for rural mobility was due to Stalin’s “dizzy with success” article,
published in 1930, which resulted in one-third of peasants leaving collectives. 75 Stalin realized
how much discontent was present in the country side and how strong the violent opposition was
growing, so he decided to slow down the process. 76 He then shifted all blame to the local
officials in each sector, claiming they had been overzealous in their efforts to get the peasantry to
join collectives. 77
The final reason behind the Soviet Union’s inability to keep its rural sector in place had
to do with their lax use of the Internal Passport System. The Soviet Union, like the CCP later,
attempted to keep its peasantry in place by issuing special passports that allowed those in the
rural countryside to leave. The government enacted the Internal Passport System in 1932 to
hinder the mobility of the rural sector. 78 Initially regulation was strict, but over time the system
was deemed annoying, inconvenient, and counterproductive to increasing industrialization. 79 The
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rural workers knew they were not being given the benefits offered to urban workers, and so when
they had the opportunity to leave they left en masse. 80
RURAL LEADERSHIP
Prior to collectivization, the CCP had also established a strong rural leadership amongst
the peasantry and had managed to incorporate a large amount of Party members into rural China,
while simultaneously recruiting many peasants to the Party. By contrast, in the Soviet Union, the
communist Party was an alien and external force during collectivization, and had weak
organization within rural sectors. 81 The CCP educated and provided training for their leaders at
the local levels, and they integrated discipline and rewards into the Party system. The CCP began
by establishing branches at all administrative levels, work units, and schools. 82 They sent in
work teams to work and live with the peasants, gaining their trust and confidence. 83 Current
Party members were thus instructed to sway village leaders to support the idea of
collectivization. 84
To continue gaining more support and followers, the CCP organized mass movements
and campaigns promoting mutual aid and continually recruited new activists. 85 The CCP did not
attempt to force collectivization on the people in the beginning but rather found local activists
and encouraged and incentivized them to rally their neighbors. 86 With the efforts of the current
Party members and the new peasant members, the CCP was able to find, recruit, and train many
peasants into leadership roles in rural China.
Effective leadership in rural China was also important in keeping the peasants happy
during collectivization. To create effective and fair leaders, the CCP constantly set up trainings
for activists in leadership and mass mobilization techniques. 87 The Party placed a heavy
emphasis on orientation and training of local cadres in mobilizing the peasantry towards
collectivization and implementing policy, while also supplying them with ideas on how to do so
with persuasion rather than force. 88 During their training, the cadres were also instructed on
some best practices for point system structuring, agricultural planning, and ways to distribute
land and other resources. 89 The CCP wanted the new leaders to be able to get more peasants on
board with collectivization, but they also wanted to make sure it was done in a way that wouldn’t
create discontent.
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In the Soviet Union, Stalin believed industrial workers would be the best choice to lead
collective farms because agriculture would eventually resemble industrial organization. 90 The
Party made the collective structure, and, along with the working class, completely disregarded
the peasantry. 91 In addition to recruiting outsiders to lead collective farms, once leaders had been
recruited to their posts they were often given basic, or even no, training. 92 The peasantry did not
respect these leaders due to their inefficiency and undereducation. They viewed these urban
leaders as bureaucratic machines that didn’t even understand the orders they were given, only
there to carry them out. 93
The CCP created an effective rural leadership system through their ideas of discipline and
rewards for leaders and knew that one of the ways agricultural problems manifested was through
bad political leadership. When local cadres exploited or treated peasants poorly, the result was
low morale and lack of work. 94 According Pavel Osinsky and Jari Eloranta, historically, when
peasants were unhappy and experiencing agrarian problems, what followed was an increase in
opposition, resistance, rebellion, and violence throughout the countryside. 95 The CCP saw this
occur in the Soviet Union, so to avoid this situation they employed practices to discourage local
leaders from abusing their posts. The structure of the Party allowed for the confrontation and
opposition of those in charge practicing immoral or unbecoming behavior. 96 The Party members
displaying these attributes could thus be “purged” from the party and from their respective
position of power, as well. 97
The rural leadership within the Soviet Union was often brutal, disrespectful, and selfish. 98
Local cadres not only threatened physical harm on the peasantry, but also embezzled collective
farms funds, appropriated deficit goods, and failed to distribute goods. 99 Local leaders would
also often coerce the peasantry into doing different tasks and labors outside of the collective
farms without any kind of payment. 100 Local leadership often completely disregarded legal
formalities or concerned themselves with appropriate behavior due to Party policies not
encouraging enforcement of punishments. 101 This phenomenon can be found in a report by a
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man named M.P Kichigin from one of the collective farms. In his report, he discussed the
behavior of a chairman in the kolkhoz, describing excessive drinking, assaulting women,
pocketing money on transactions, and corrupting other leaders. 102 The chairman had been
reported multiple times, but nothing was ever done to rectify the situation. Stories and reports
such as this one were not uncommon in the collective farms of the Soviet Union.
Another tactic used by the CCP to control local leaders was by incentivizing them. Those
who did well in the Party and showed potential were given positions of leadership and other
benefits, especially when they were poorer peasants. 103 The CCP wanted the poorer and middle
class peasants to join the collectivization movement, so they incentivized them at every step.
Those already in leadership positions could seek further promotions and benefits by displaying
their intense loyalty in the Party. 104 Local leaders were also heavily motivated to push
collectivization because it gave them more control over other peasants’ lives and expanded their
own opportunities. 105 So, by enforcing discipline and distributing rewards, the CCP managed to
create a relatively uncorrupt rural leadership.
NATURE OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
The final political factor behind peasants’ lack of resistance stems from political
discourse surrounding agricultural collectivization. The CCP promised the peasantry
collectivization would bring about benefits for not only the state, but also for the peasants. They
also told the peasantry collectivization would be a volunteer effort and no one would force them
to do what they didn’t want to. The CCP believed discontent could be fought by persuasion and
education rather than violence and punishment. 106 They hoped that by coaxing the peasantry
into collectivization, they would get them to do what they wanted and most importantly, without
any real resistance. 107
The promise of mutual benefits between state and peasantry also played a role in the
discourse surrounding collectivization. The CCP did their best not to alienate the peasants as
other political parties in the past had. Instead, they attempted to include and educate peasantry on
the decision to collectivize. 108 They found that by promising the peasantry implementation of
land reform and policies, improving agrarian production, and securing their fruits, they could
peacefully encourage rather than force the peasantry into collectivization. 109 Mao believed by
offering the peasantry something to better their livelihood,
They (the peasants) will break all the shackles that bind them and rush
toward the road of liberation. All imperialists, warlords, corrupt officials
102
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and bad gentry will meet their doom at the hands of the peasants. All
revolutionary parties and comrades will be judged by them. 110
He understood what the peasantry had to offer and found that, by offering material benefits and
political patronage, the Party would receive recruits and logistical supports. 111 In short, the CCP
believed they could bring about collectivization without force; they would instead persuade the
peasantry to comply through benefits.
Incentives and benefits were viewed differently within the Soviet Union. The Party
attempted to gain collectivization support by promising the peasants a generous supply of
tractors and other machinery to accomplish their work quicker. 112 The peasants, however, saw
the cost of the machinery repairs and found them to be more of a burden than boon. 113 The rural
countryside was informed they could increase their livelihood through collective marks, bonuses,
prizes, special rewards, and other permissible incomes. 114 In reality, however, the peasants were
making little income and were disinclined to work harder, thus unable to actually ever receive
these special incomes.
In both China and the Soviet Union, propaganda was used to explicitly sell the peasantry
on collective farming. Stalin used it as a way of promoting the progress of the collective farms
and claiming peasants were “flocking” to collectives. 115 Mao followed in these same footsteps,
claiming the process of collectivization was almost complete by 1951, when it was closer to
1953. The propaganda within the Soviet Union focused on presenting collectivization of
agriculture as the solution to all of society’s problems. 116 While in China, the CCP claimed the
peasants were living in a utopian countryside cured from both ideological and physical
problems. 117 Both countries utilized the benefits of propaganda, but the CCP typically targeted
their propaganda at the peasants and the benefits they would receive. While comparably, the
Soviet Union often targeted collective leaders, stressing the consequences of not meeting
procurement rates and getting peasants into the collectives at a decent rate.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, a discussion of five political factors explains why the Chinese peasants
resisted less than the Russian peasants during their collectivization periods. Now we must look at
the results in both countries to understand the impact of these factors on reducing resistance
within China compared to the Soviet Union. As mentioned in the literature review, the peasants
110
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within the Soviet Union often resisted through not only passivity, but also incredible violence. If
the famines that occurred following both collective drives are not considered, the Soviet Union
had an enormous death toll from violence-based resistance compared to that of China. 118
It should be noted there was also resistance within China during the Great Leap Forward,
but it was comparably less extensive than its Soviet Union counterpart. The resistance within
China has been described as small resistance occurrences in the forms of lack of cooperation and
simply eating animals before they were to be collectivized. 119 According to Huaiyin Li, the
peasantry did not ordinarily participate in collective riots, but rather individualized bribing,
threatening suicide, complaining, and building fake kinship relations. 120 Overall, the peasantry
within the Chinese collective movement tended to threaten more subtle acts of defiance and
acted on a more individualized effort to resist, whereas in the Soviet Union, the peasantry tended
to join together in collective resistance, thus explaining the more widespread effect the peasantry
had within the Soviet Union.
The Great Leap Forward lasted for a short period of time but had massive repercussions
for China. This paper argued five political factors, implemented in China prior to the Great Leap
Forward, had a tremendous impact on the resistance level to the collectives, while also arguing
that, even with these policies aimed at supposedly helping the peasants, the direct consequence
was a Great Famine which killed millions of people. This paper showed how implanting these
factors reduced the level of resistance, compared to that of the Soviet Union, which was filled
with large amounts of violent resistance. In closing, China’s approach to integrating the
peasantry into collective farms by utilizing persuasion and incentives allowed them much more
control in combatting and eliminating resistance during collectivization compared to the Soviet
Union.
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